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Wilson v. State, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 34, 114 P.3d 285 (June 23, 2005)1  
 
CRIMINAL-CHILD PORNOGRAPHY 
 
Summary 
 
 A jury convicted Wiley Gene Wilson of four counts of use of a minor in the 
production of pornography and four counts of possession of visual presentations 
depicting sexual conduct of a person under sixteen years of age.  Wilson appealed, 
arguing that his four convictions for using a child in a sexual performance were 
redundant convictions. 
 In September of 2001, Wilson and the ten-year-old female victim (M.T.) left 
M.T.'s father's trailer to attend to errands related to installing a satellite television system.  
Apparently, while running errands and stuck in traffic, M.T. urinated in her clothing.  
Subsequently, Wilson took M.T. to Wal-Mart and purchased her new clothes to replace 
the ones she had urinated in.  Wilson also purchased a Polaroid camera and instant film at 
the same time.   Subsequently, while M.T. changed her clothes, Wilson told M.T. to pose 
in various positions and took four photographs of M.T. unclothed.  Based on these facts, 
a jury convicted Wilson on four counts of using a child in a sexual performance.  Wilson 
appealed, arguing that the four convictions were redundant because they involved the use 
of a child in a single sexual performance. 
 The court held that the threshold issue to determine whether Wilson’s convictions 
were redundant is “whether Wilson committed a single act or four individual acts that are 
punishable as separate violations of NRS 200.710.”2  Based upon the statutory language 
of NRS 200.710, the court held that “the crux of the prohibited conduct is the use of a 
minor in sexual performance and not how the performance is otherwise recorded or 
documented.”3  For example, had Wilson filmed the minor’s performance rather than 
taken photographs, Wilson would have only been convicted of one violation rather than 
four.  Based on this logic, the court unequivocally held that the focus of the crime must 
be on the performance and not the way it is documented.  As a result, the court reversed 
three of Wilson's four convictions for the production of child pornography. 
 Wilson was also convicted of possession of child pornography under NRS 
200.730.4  Wilson argued that his conviction on four counts of possession of child 
                                                 
1 By Kathleen L. Fellows 
2 Wilson v. State, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 34, 114 P.3d 285 (2005).  NEV. REV. STAT. 200.710 states:   
  1. A person who knowingly uses, encourages, entices or permits a minor to 
simulate or engage in or assist others to simulate or engage in sexual conduct to 
produce a performance is guilty of a category A felony and shall be punished as 
provided in NRS 200.750. 
  2. A person who knowingly uses, encourages, entices, coerces or permits a 
minor to be the subject of a sexual portrayal in a performance is guilty of a category 
A felony and shall be punished as provided in NRS 200.750, regardless of whether 
the minor is aware that the sexual portrayal is part of a performance. 
3 Wilson, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 34, 114 P.3d 285. 
4 A person violates NEV. REV. STAT. 200.730 "who knowingly and willfully has in his possession for any 
purpose any film, photograph or other visual presentation depicting a person under the age of 16 years as 
pornography violated double jeopardy because those counts were lesser-included 
offenses of the production charges.  The court, however, upheld Wilson's convictions 
under NRS 200.730 because the requisite intent between the two statutes differed.   
 Further, Wilson's right to confront his victim under the Sixth Amendment was not 
violated.  While the child victim was cross-examined at trial with her back to Wilson, 
Wilson did not produce sufficient evidence to prove his right under the Sixth Amendment 
had been violated and failed to object until the end of his case. 
 The court also dismissed Wilson’s claim that the State violated Article IV(c) of 
the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) for failure to commence trial within 180 
days of Wilson’s detention.  The court held that the 180-day time limit is not absolute and 
can be extended with good cause.  
 Lastly, the court dismissed Wilson’s claim that his due process was violated when 
the district court failed to compel attendance of out-of-state witnesses.  The court held 
that because of jurisdictional limitations, they may only compel out-of-state witnesses if 
they are present in the State of Nevada.  
 
Issues and Dispositions 
 
 Issues 
 
1. Does the use of a child in a single sexual performance in which multiple 
photographs are taken constitute a single offense or multiple offenses 
under NRS 200.710? 
 
2. Is possession of child pornography under NRS 200.730 a lesser-included 
offense to the production of child pornography under NRS 200.710? 
 
3. Is a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to confront his or her accuser 
under the Sixth Amendment violated when the victim is cross-examined at 
trial but cannot see the defendant?   
 
 Dispositions 
 
1. The act of photographing a victim constitutes one event for purposes of 
NRS 200.710. 
 
2. No.  The crime of possession of child pornography is not a lesser-included 
offense to the production of child pornography as defined by Nevada law.   
 
3. No.  Wilson did not provide the substantive proof necessary to prove that 
the prosecutor violated his Sixth Amendment right. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
the subject of a sexual portrayal or engaging in or simulating, or assisting others to engage in or simulate, 
sexual conduct." 
Commentary 
 
 State of the Law Before Wilson 
 
  Redundant Convictions 
Prior to Wilson, the Nevada Supreme Court declared convictions redundant in two 
situations:  (1) when the statutory language indicates one rather than multiple criminal 
violations was contemplated;5 and (2) when legislative history shows that an ambiguous 
statute was intended to assess punishment.6  “When a defendant receives multiple 
convictions based on a single act, this court will reverse ‘redundant convictions that do 
not comport with legislative intent.’”7  Additionally, Crowley v. State8 recently set forth 
that where conduct was incidental to a sexual assault, it should be treated as one episode 
of assault.9 
 Nevada uses the Blockburger10 test to determine whether multiple convictions 
arising from a single incident are permissible.  "Under this test, 'if the elements of one 
offense are entirely included within the elements of a second offense, the first offense is a 
lesser included offense and the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits a conviction for both 
offenses.'"11  
 
  Confrontation Clause 
 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides every criminal 
defendant with the right to confront his or her accuser.12  The United States Supreme 
Court held in Coy v. Iowa13 that a screen to block the defendant’s view of a witness on 
the stand violates the Sixth Amendment.14  The Supreme Court noted that “[i]t is difficult 
to imagine a more obvious or damaging violation of the defendant’s right to a face-to-
face encounter.”15 
 Nevada held in Smith v. State16 that the Sixth Amendment was violated when the 
prosecutor positioned himself between the child victim and the defendant so that the 
witness could not see the defendant during her direct testimony and vice versa.17 
 
 Effect of Wilson on Current Nevada Law 
  
  Redundant Convictions 
 "The purpose of Nevada's child pornography statutes is to protect children from 
the harms of sexual exploitation and prevent the distribution of child pornography."18  As 
                                                 
5 Jefferson v. State, 95 Nev. 577, 599 P.2d 1043 (1979). 
6 Carter v. State, 98 Nev. 331, 334-35, 647 P.2d 374, 376 (1982).  
7 Eberling v. State, 120 Nev. 401, 404, 91 P.3d 599, 601 (2004). 
8 120 Nev. 30, 83 P.3d 282 (2004). 
9 Id. 
10 Blockburger v. U.S., 284 U.S. 299 (1932). 
11 Wilson, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 34, 114 P.3d 285 (citations omitted). 
12 U.S. CONST. amend. VI;  
13 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).  
14 Id. at 1015-22.  
15 Id. at 1020.  
16 111 Nev. 499, 894 P.2d 974 (1995). 
17 Id.  
such, the holding in Wilson is very limited in scope.  The court determined that Wilson's 
convictions were redundant because they happened all on the same day, at the same time, 
and with one child.  Nevertheless, it seems as if the photographs had been taken at 
different times of day or there had been multiple children involved, the court may have 
held the convictions were not redundant.   
 Additionally, the court upheld all four convictions for possession of child 
pornography, which conflicts slightly with the reasoning the court utilized in overturning 
the redundant convictions for production of child pornography.  Using the same video 
analogy, under NRS 200.730, possession of one video, no matter how long in length, 
would constitute one conviction.  However, possession of multiple still photographs 
constitutes multiple convictions under Wilson.  Accordingly, the court has sent 
conflicting messages regarding what type of crimes may be evaluated under their test for 
redundant convictions.    
 Another interesting perspective regarding the mutual exclusivity of NRS 200.710 
and NRS 200.730 is that Crowley held anything incidental to the production of child 
pornography to be included in the charge under NRS 200.710.  Wilson does not clarify 
whether memorializing the activity is incidental to the production of child pornography.  
The court noted that the fact Wilson "maintained possession, until he was arrested days 
later on an unrelated offense, amounts to the commission of a separate and distinct crime 
from the initial production of the photographs."19  Yet, the court never clarified whether 
Wilson would have been guilty under NRS 200.730 had he not maintained possession of 
the photographs beyond the performance of the sexual activity. 
  
  Confrontation Clause 
 Nevada’s interpretation of the confrontation clause does not appear to have 
changed under Wilson v. State.  Nevertheless, Wilson refines the level of substantive 
proof necessary to establish a violation of the Sixth Amendment and the timing for 
making an objection.  As a result of Wilson, a defendant must make a contemporaneous 
objection during the questioning of his or her accuser and a defendant must firmly 
establish exactly how his view was blocked during questioning.    
 
Conclusion 
 
 In conclusion, the act of photographing a victim on the same day, at the same 
time, with the same child constitutes one event for purposes of NRS 200.710.  
Additionally, the crime of possession of child pornography is not a lesser-included 
offense to the production of child pornography as defined by Nevada law.   
 
                                                                                                                                                 
18 Id.  (citing State v. Dist. Ct., 120 Nev. 254, 263, 89 P.3d 663, 668 (2004). 
19 Wilson, 121 Nev. Adv. Op. 34, 114 P.3d 285. 
